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Abstract
Does economic development promote media freedom? Do higher advertising revenues tend to make media
outlets independent of political groupsinuence? Using data on the 19th century American newspapers, I show
that in places with higher advertising revenues, newspapers were more likely to be independent from political
parties. Similar results hold when local advertising rates are instrumented by regulations on outdoor advertising
and newspaper distribution. I also show that newly created newspapers were more likely to enter the market
as independents in markets with higher advertising rates.
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1 Introduction
Media sponsored by inuence groups often report distorted information to their audience. Independent media,
though not unbiased, tend to provide more objective coverage,1 promote electoral accountability, reduce corruption,
and restrict managerial diversion.2 How can such independent media emerge? According to both theoretical models
(Besley and Prat, 2006, Gentzkow et al., 2006, Petrova 2009) and historical accounts (Baldasty, 2002, Smythe 2002,
Starr 2004), the growth of an advertising market is an important factor for the development of independent media.
So far, however, there is no systematic empirical evidence to validate this claim. Hamilton (2004) and Gentzkow
et al. (2006)3 provide an empirical analysis of newspapers in the 19th century United States which shows that
there were more independent newspapers in places with faster population growth; this could be taken as suggestive
evidence in favor of the hypothesis.
In this paper, I use data on American newspapers in 1880-85 to show that the growth of an advertising
market promotes media independence from political inuence groups. Several theoretical explanations underpin
this argument. First, as shown formally in Besley and Prat (2006) and Gentzkow et al. (2006), if the protability
of advertising is high, then it is costly for media outlets to distort their news coverage in the direction desired by a
subsidizing group. Any deviation from the coverage that maximizes the audience means the loss of the audience and
the loss of corresponding advertising revenues. Second, market expansion increases variety, and independent media
can ll the gap that had not been served by sponsored media.4 Third, there might be the private benet of control
for media editors that is associated with the possibility of expressing their own opinion (Djankov et al. 2003).
Higher revenues from advertising together with these benets could outweigh the loss of subsidies from political
parties. Fourth, as argued in Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002), the growth of advertising allows media outlets to
choose the same politically neutral reporting because price competition becomes relatively less important for their
prots.
1Djankov et al. (2003), Besley and Prat (2006), Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006).
2Empirical accounts include Dyck et al., 2009, Snyder and Strömberg, 2008, Brunetti and Weder, 2003, Gentzkow et al., 2006,
Reinikka and Svennson, 2006, Dyck et al., 2008, just to mention a few.
3Hamilton (2004) provides an empirical analysis of the political a¢ liation of newspapers in the largest U.S. cities to show that there
were more independent newspapers in more populous cities and in cities with smaller foreign-born and African-American populations.
Gentzkow et al. (2006) show that there is a correlation between the change in population of big cities and the change in the share of
readership of independent newspapers in these cities.
4See e.g. Chen and Riordan (2007) for a formal model which is related to this argument.
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However, there are theoretical reasons why this argument may not always hold. First, as discussed in Petrova
(2009), if consumers do not pay too much attention to media slant, then it might be protable for a special interest
group or a political party to pay higher subsidies to media outlets if their advertising revenues go up, because
this implies that their audience grows. Second, as shown in Gehlbach and Sonin (2008), the growth of advertising
creates an incentive for the government to use non-market strategies to capture the media and, correspondingly,
to nationalize the associated prots.
Empirically, I test whether there is a positive relationship between the growth of the advertising market and
the growth of independent media. I also look at whether the relationship might be interpreted as causal, and
through what mechanism the e¤ect was working. I analyze data on American newspapers during 1880-85. During
that time, the majority of newspapers were a¢ liated with a major political party, but some were independent.
As discussed in the background section, the main di¤erence between partisan newspapers (newspapers a¢ liated
with the Democratic or Republican party) and independent newspapers was not the size of the bias but rather the
extent of control a party had over the newspapers news coverage. Editors of independent newspapers could print
whatever they wanted, while editors of partisan newspapers were restricted in their decisions.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it presents empirical evidence of the link
between the development of advertising markets and the growth of independent newspapers. I show that even in
specications with newspaper xed e¤ects, there is a signicant positive correlation between local advertising rates
and independent a¢ liation of a newspaper. To avoid the problem that advertising rates could be chosen as a result
of strategic interaction among the newspapers in a market, I also look at the entry of new newspapers. I nd that
new newspapers were more likely to be independent in the markets with higher advertising rates per reader and
thus higher protability of advertising.
Second, the paper presents evidence in favor of a causal relationship between local advertising rates and news-
papers independence. A potential endogeneity problem with previous specications is that some unobserved
time-varying parameter may shift both the demand for independent newspapers and local advertising rates. Also,
there may be a reverse causality problem, because independent newspapers could charge higher advertising rates.
I address these problems by using instrumental variable estimation. For the state of Massachusetts, I report the
results using local regulation of outdoor advertising, and of newspaper and handbill distribution, as instruments
for local advertising rates. These restrictions were triggered after the 1873 scandal involving the advertisement of
a patent medicine, S T 1860 X," which was painted on a rock near Niagara Falls (Taylor and Chang, 1995), an
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event plausibly orthogonal to the development of an independent press in Massachusetts. The results are consistent
with results for the xed-e¤ect estimations and the results for newly created newspapers.
Third, I present evidence that economic development was not the only cause of the development of an inde-
pendent press, as some authors have suggested.5 The structure of political power in a city played an important
role. In particular, in county seats (administrative capitals of counties, which often had their own legislative body)
where there were more opportunities for political parties to inuence local newspapers, there were fewer indepen-
dent newspapers, despite the fact that the county seats were, on average, more populous, more developed, and
had higher advertising rates than other cities in the same county. Other evidence in favor of a political channel
comes from variation over time. I nd that new newspapers were signicantly more likely to be partisan if they
were created during 1880 and 1884, the years of presidential elections, during which parties presumably had more
incentives to support partisan newspapers.6 These results suggest that the growth of advertising markets and
economic development do not guarantee freedom of the press, because of the existence of political factors.
I also look at the circulation of di¤erent kinds of newspapers to nd out which theoretical explanations for
the relationship between advertising and independence are consistent with the data. For daily newspapers, it
seems plausible that independent ones attracted a larger audience, and that this was the main incentive to be
independent.7 However, I nd that for the subsample of weekly newspapers, independent newspapers had a
smaller circulation than partisan papers, constituting approximately 90 percent of the sample. These ndings
are consistent with either the variety or the private-benets-of-control explanation. Note that it is important to
look at weeklies, not only at dailies, because they played an important role in exposing corruption and promoting
progressive era legislation during the "muckraking" era (Dyck et al., 2009). Overall, it seems that for di¤erent
groups of newspapers, di¤erent mechanisms underpin the relationship between the development of an advertising
market and the growth of independent newspapers.
I focus on the 19th century United States for several reasons. First, the newspaper market was very dynamic
then: newspapers entered and exited the market every year, and advertising rates exhibited signicant variation
over time and space. This allows me to use state, county, city, newspaper, and year xed e¤ects in my estimation.
Second, at that time newspapers had self-reported political a¢ liations (Republican, Democratic, Independent),
which provides a convenient proxy for the control by political parties. The background section of the paper
5E.g. Baldasty, 2002, Gentzkow et al., 2006, Hamilton, 2004.
6This idea was discussed in Kaplan (2002), though no empirical tests were provided to validate the claim.
7As discussed in Baldasty (1992), Gentzkow et al. (2006), and Hamilton (2004)
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discusses di¤erent mechanisms that the parties used to exercise such control. Third, a major advertising agency
published newspapers advertising rates and political a¢ liations during this time period, so there are data that can
be used to test the outlined hypotheses. Fourth, during this time period an unexpected event triggered a wave of
local regulations on advertising, which permits the use of instrumental variable analysis. Finally, the institutional
environment in the United States in the1880s (the Gilded Age) was similar to that of many modern middle-
income countries with weak institutions, like Russia or Mexico (Shleifer and Treisman 2004). Thus, the results of
this paper are not necessarily specic to the unique path of political development of the late 19th century United
States, but may be extended, with caution, to media systems in developing countries in our time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a brief overview of the related literature; Section 3
presents basic background information on American newspapers in the 19th century and their relationships with
political parties; Section 4 contains the empirical results; and Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature
Recent literature highlights the fact that independent media is important for the quality of governance. Free and
competitive media promote accountability of elected politicians (Lacrinese et al., 2007, Puglisi and Snyder, 2008),
while uninformative media prevent accountability mechanisms from working (Besley and Prat, 2006, Besley and
Burgess, 2002, Strömberg 2004a, Strömberg 2004b). Similarly, countries with little media freedom are more prone
to corruption (Brunetti and Weder 2003, Ahrend 2002), have a lower level of social spending (Petrova 2008), and
have a less e¢ cient bureaucracy (Egorov et al. 2009). Moreover, independent media outlets are important in order
to prevent corrupt and incompetent governments from staying in power. For example, McMillan and Zoido (2004)
show that in Peru a small independent TV channel created the opportunity for countrys citizens to overthrow the
corrupt government.
Media also play an important role in policy outcomes. Several new studies that use experimental and instru-
mental variable approaches have shown that media e¤ects are signicant, and are not conned to reinforcement
of existing preferences, in contrast to earlier ndings of political communication literature.8 Gerber et al. (2009)
conducted a randomized experiment, providing individuals with a free subscription to The Washington Times or
The Washington Post. They nd a substantial e¤ect on voting behavior: those who received The Washington
8E.g. Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, Berelson et al. 1954, Converse 1966.
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Post were 8% more likely to vote for Democratic candidates. Using a quasi-natural experiment, DellaVigna and
Kaplan (2007) use the idiosyncratic di¤usion of Fox News before the 2000 U.S. elections to show that it made
voters in the a¤ected counties more likely to vote for Republican candidates. In a similar spirit, Enikolopov et al.
(2009) use the geographic variation in the availability of NTV, a formerly independent TV channel in Russia, to
identify its impact on voting in 1999 Russian Parliamentary elections. They nd that NTV had a positive e¤ect
on the vote for the opposition party, which was supported by the channel, and a negative e¤ect on the vote for the
pro-government party. Likewise, George and Waldfogel (2006) analyze the penetration of the New York Times in
local U.S. newspaper markets the 1990s to show that it decreased turnout in local elections.
There are also studies showing that media may inuence public policy. Strömberg (2004a) nds that in the
United States in the 1930s, radio di¤usion in a county was positively correlated with the level of public expenditures
in the region. Similarly, Einesee and Strömberg (2007) show that during the last 35 years, the amount of media
coverage, instrumented by external newsworthy events such as the Olympic Games, determined U.S. disaster
relief. Using a cross-sectional approach, Besley and Burgess (2002) nd that state governments in India are more
responsive to declines in food production and crop ood damage in those places where newspaper circulation is
higher. In a similar spirit, Reinikka and Svensson (2005) show that public spending on education in Uganda was
higher in schools whose funding arrangements were covered by local newspapers. Alternatively, using data on
the di¤erent t between newspaper markets and political districts, Snyder and Strömberg (2008) nd that in the
United States the amount of press coverage of local politics has an impact on both policy outcomes and politicians
behavior.
In this paper, I use data on the growth of independent newspapers in the United States in the 19th century.
In the literature, one of the most common explanations for this growth is that improving economic conditions
stimulated the change from partisan to independent media (Baldasty 1992, Gentzkow et al. 2006, Hamilton 2004,
Starr 2004, Smythe 2003). There are also other explanations: for example, Lippmann (1931) and Park (1925)
write about the natural," not wholly rational" transition from politically biased news towards more objective
reporting, which all media systems necessarily experience. Others argue that such a transition could happen
because of various social or technological changes: increased egalitarianism (Schudson 1978), increased literacy
(Mott 1941), innovations in printing (Douglas 1999), or in telegraphy (Thompson 1947).
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3 Historical background
In the second half of the 19th century, most American newspapers were partisan, i.e. they were o¢ cially a¢ liated
with either the Republican or the Democratic party.9 For a newspaper, a¢ liation with a political party had both
benets and costs. The benets included direct and indirect subsidies from political parties and better access to
political information.10 The costs were restrictions on the content of the newspaper, i.e. a lack of control and
the inability to address a broad audience with di¤erent political preferences.11 Parties required their a¢ liated
newspapers to support all of their o¢ cial decisions, prohibited them from covering conicting points of views, and
overall restricted their content.12
Several mechanisms for subsidizing newspapers were available to political parties. It is di¢ cult to nd evidence
of direct sponsorship, though some authors suggest that direct subsidies were used (Baldasty, 1992, Lee, 1923,
Mott, 1941). Parties widely used budget money to sponsor newspapers with which they were a¢ liated.13 By law,
all new local laws, ordinances, and regulations must be published in local newspapers, and the newspapers were
paid from budgets for publications. These newspapers were chosen by the members of city councils or boards of
aldermen that is, by people usually a¢ liated with political parties.14 Ordinances often explicitly required chosen
newspapers to represent the interests of one of the two major parties. For example, Ithacas charter of 1897 stated
ordinances. . . should be published in at least two o¢ cial newspapers. . . The members of the common council. . .
should designate, in writing, a paper fairly representing the political party to which they respectively belong."15
The amount of money distributed through this channel was fairly large. An ordinance of the city of Brooklyn,
N.Y., for example, required that this amount be capped at $100,000, paid to four o¢ cial partisan newspapers, for
publishing new municipal acts and ordinances.16 This corresponds to approximately $1.5 million in 2000 dollars.
9Ayer (1881-1886), Mott (1941), Kaplan (2002), Schudson 1978, Smythe (2003).
10Starr (2004), Kaplan (2002).
11Baldasty (1992), Kaplan (2002), Smythe (2003).
12For example, after the Free Press, an o¢ cial Democratic newspaper in Detroit, refused to support Horace Greeley, an o¢ cial
Democratic candidate in the 1872 Presidential race, its editor had to raise capital and buy out a conicting owners share, because the
newspaper was threatened with losing its status as a party organ (Kaplan 2002).
13Baldasty (1992), Kaplan (2002).
14For the references, see the list of analyzed charters of laws and ordinances in Table A1.
15Source: Charters and Ordinances, City of Ithaca, New York. Ithaca, N.Y. 1897.
16Source: Laws as contained in an Act to revise and combine in a single act all existing special and local laws a¤ecting public interests
in the City of Brooklyn. Albany, N.Y., 1888.
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The mechanism just described was more prevalent in county capitals, also called county seats.17 As discussed in
Baldasty (1992), county seats were especially prone to newspaper patronage, because they could reward newspapers
in cash through county-level printing contracts.
There were also indirect perks that partisan newspapers, unlike independent newspapers, enjoyed. Political
parties facilitated gathering political information and news reporting for a¢ liated newspapers. All partisan news-
papers could gain access to state congressional hearings and to the partys caucuses (which was problematic for
independent newspapers).18 Newspapers a¢ liated with parties used party o¢ cials as a primary source for their
information.19
Finally, the party members were obliged to support the local partisan newspapers, even if the price was relatively
high. Party o¢ cials insisted that subscribing to a partisan newspaper was a necessary duty of any devoted party
member (Kaplan, 2002). The political parties generated the audience for these newspapers and, in turn, enjoyed
their enthusiastic support.
In sum, partisan newspapers newspapers, o¢ cially associated with political parties, were di¤erent from inde-
pendent newspapers. As a result, the presence (or absence) of political a¢ liation implied a particular organizational
structure of a newspaper, its news coverage, and the way it was.20
4 Empirical evidence
4.1 Argument and hypotheses
In this paper the argument is that higher prots from advertising allow newspapers to break their a¢ liation with
political parties and to declare themselves independent. Several theoretical models are related to this idea. Some
authors suggest that higher advertising revenue per capita increases the benets of being independent while costs
17County seats were administrative centers of counties, with the authority to enact and enforce county-level ordinances.
18Starr (2004).
19Kaplan (2002), Starr (2004).
20Partisan newspapers were di¤erent in their news coverage and the pattern of their endorsements (Kaplan 2002, Mott 1941, Smythe,
2003). For example, Kaplan (2002) conducted content analysis of di¤erent newspapers in Detroit in the second half of 19th century and
found that Republican newspapers focused almost exclusively on Republican issues (endorsed Republican candidates, wrote about the
dangers of the Ku-Klux-Klan and racism, criticized Democrats), while Democratic newspapers focused on Democratic issues (endorsed
Democratic candidates, wrote about crimes committed by Blacks or corrupted Republican politicians, criticized Republicans in general).
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remain constant; as a result, we should expect a positive relationship between the protability of advertising and
media independence. In Besley and Prat (2006) and Gentzkow et al. (2006), newspapers are less likely to be biased
in favor of a government or an interest group if advertising revenues per reader are high because bias decreases a
newspapers audience. In an earlier paper, Gabszewicz et al. (2001) show that an increase in advertising revenues
per capita makes price competition less important, thus creating conditions for the centrist equilibrium in which
both newspapers choose the same politically neutral ideology. Petrova (2009) presents a model in which the higher
protability of advertising moves two newspapers, under the inuence of one or two interest groups, toward the
ideal point of the consumers. However, this happens only if consumers demand is elastic with respect to media bias;
otherwise, the relationship between the protability of advertising and media bias becomes positive. In Gehlbach
and Sonin (2008), the growth of advertising creates an incentive for the government to use non-market strategies
to capture media outlets, because the government can nationalize the associated prots .21
The theoretical underpinnings of the relationship between advertising protability and media independence
depends on the assumptions of the corresponding models. However, it is not clear that these assumptions are
realistic. Therefore, the question of the relative importance of advertising revenues for media independence is
mostly an empirical one. The main goal of this paper is to conduct empirical tests of this argument.
Here, the main hypothesis is that the local protability of advertising has increased the number of independent
newspapers; i.e., it has created incentives for media outlets to become independent of political parties.
Hypothesis 1 In places with higher advertising protability, there was a greater likelihood that the news-
paper was independent.
If Hypothesis 1 is conrmed, then it is important to look at the entry of new newspapers into the market.
Looking only at new entries allows us to solve a potential endogeneity problem arising because the newspapers
in the same market can choose their advertising rates as best responses to each others strategy. For any causal
mechanism to link advertising and newspaper independence, it should be applicable not only for newspapers that
coexisted in the market at any given point of time, but also for new newspapers just entering the market. Also,
for new newspapers that just entered the market, all potential costs and benets discussed earlier should be of
particular importance, not the ongoing decisions of established newspapers with their own reputations, historical
21Ellman and Germano (2009) approach the problem from a di¤erent perspective. In their model, advertisers themselves have
preferences about news content, and the increase in advertising can lead to more or less pro-advertiser bias, depending on the extent
of competition among newspapers and the ability of advertisers to use punishment cut-o¤ strategies.
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relationships with political parties (or their absence), and di¤erent potential costs of switching.
Hypothesis 1a In places with higher advertising protability, there was a higher probability that newly
created newspapers chose to be partisan.
In the above-mentioned theoretical models, the mechanism of advertising e¤ects is based primarily on the
assumption that the audience prefers less biased media outlets. Although it certainly depends on the market
structure, ,on average independent newspapers, especially in one-newspaper markets, are expected to have a larger
audience, because this is supposed to be a primary reason for their becoming independent.22
Hypothesis 2 Independent newspapers had larger circulation than partisan newspapers.
4.2 Data description
The main source of the data is Ayers Directory of Newspapers 1881-1886, an annual catalog of newspapers and
magazines that was published by the advertising agency Ayer and Sons Company.23 For each newspaper, the
directory reports the prevailing advertising rate that it charged. In addition, the directory provides information
on the political a¢ liation of each newspaper, its circulation, the size of a newspaper page, the number of pages,
periodicity, and geographical location (i.e., the main city, county, and state where the newspaper was distributed).
Ayers purpose was to provide information to potential advertisers.24 For each year of the catalog, which was
published in August, there is information on newspapers that existed in the preceding year. In other words, the
data on newspapers political a¢ liation available cover 1880 to 1885.
In the dataset, I include only those newspapers that were published at least once per week and with a clear
political a¢ liation: Democratic, Republican, or Independent. I exclude magazines, scientic journals, travel al-
manacs, advertising catalogs, and religious newspapers. Overall, the dataset contains 24,168 observations on 7,319
newspapers in 3,444 cities in 1,599 counties. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for newspaper-level variables.
22Note that the hypothesis that the audience preferes independent newspapers does not necessarily imply that independent newspapers
have larger circulation. It could be that it is more protable to be a partisan newspaper if there are enough independent newspapers
already in the market. However, the situation was the opposite: partisan newspapers occupied the market, and independent newspapers
entered the market in the late 19th century. So, this consideration cannot explain why independent newspapers would have the same
circulation as partisan newspapers, although it could explain why independent newspapers would have smaller circulation than partisan
newspapers.
23Ayers directory stopped reporting advertising rates in 1887; from that point on it published subscription prices instead. Ayers
catalogs were published from 1880 to 1985.
24See Hower, 1939 for the history of the Ayer and Sons Company.
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For each newspaper, I created dummy variables Independent, Republican, Democratic, equal to one if the
political a¢ liation of the newspaper was Independent, Republican, or Democratic, respectively, and zero otherwise.
I also use data on advertising rates (in dollars per 10 lines for one month), circulation (in distributed copies), year of
establishment, and periodicity (weekly, daily, bi-weekly, tri-weekly etc). In the dataset, there are 2,243 Independent,
2,868 Democratic, and 2,698 Republican newspapers.
Plain advertising rates come from Ayers Newspaper Annuals, given as the prices of ten lines of advertising
published for one month.
Because the demand for independent versus partisan newspapers may depend on the populations political
preferences, it is important to take them into account in the analysis. To control for changing political preferences,
I use data on county-level electoral results in presidential and congressional elections from the Clubb et al. (2006)
dataset provided by the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). For each county
and year, I have the percentage of votes for Republican, Democratic, and other party candidates, as well as the
turnout from the most recent presidential and congressional elections. I also use data on county seat locations from
the Sechrist (1986) dataset (ICPSR study 8159).
Finally, I rely on the Census data on population as reconstructed by Haines (2005): total county population
(logged); share of urban population (computed as population in cities larger than 25,000, divided by total popula-
tion); average wage in manufacture (logged); and average agricultural income per family (logged, and computed as
total income in agricultural sector divided by the number of families in agriculture). For all Census variables for
the years 1881-85 (that is, between the 1880 and 1890 censuses), I use linearly interpolated data. My data on city
population come from Ayers catalog and is reported on the basis of detailed Census data or population estimates.
This variable does not change from year to year. The summary statistics for city-level and county-level variables
are presented in Table 2.
4.3 Market structure
For political newspapers, the market structure varied signicantly across cities. Some were the only newspaper in
a city; others were in duopolistic markets. Only 5% were in markets with more than 5 newspapers.25
The market for newspapers operated primarily on the city level. Local newspapers used to write about local
25 In the entire sample, 4,087 were in a single newspaper city, 2997 in a two-newspaper city, 1513 in a city with three newspapers,
858 in cities with 4 or 5 newspapers, and 358 in cities with more than 5 newspapers.
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news, and subscriptions the primary source of distribution of smaller newspapers was often available only to
city residents. Only the weekend editions of high-circulation newspapers in Boston, New York, and Washington
were distributed more broadly.26 Overall, during that time period the newspapers located in di¤erent cities did
not directly compete with each other.
The newspaperspolitical a¢ liations can be decomposed into entries (that is, new newspapers that enter the
market), exits (old newspapers that exit the market), changes (newspapers that change their political a¢ liation),
and mergers and acquisitions. I have data available for 10,204 newspapers, and for 7,319 of them I also have
corresponding socioeconomic data from Census and electoral statistics. Overall, there are 2,992 entries, 2,834 exits
for the year before 1886, and 515 changes. Note that the data do not reect the fact that some entry and exits
were caused by mergers and acquisitions, so the number of entries and exits in the sample may be somewhat
overstated.27
Two hundreds eighty newspapers went from being partisan to being independent and two hundreds fty nine
from being independent to being partisan. Thirty two newspapers even went from being Democratic to Republican
and twenty ve from being Republican to Democratic. Not all of these newspapers were located in the South,
thus changing their political a¢ liation because of partisan realignment following the end of Reconstruction (in the
South the number of switchers was 7 and 6, respectively). Some newspapers even changed their a¢ liation more
than once.
The newspapers that changed their political a¢ liation mostly did so because of a poor nancial situation. The
regressions with a dummy for switching a¢ liations as a dependent variable show that the main determinant of
switching was the newspapers low circulation in the previous years. Also, newspapers were more likely to switch if
they were located in counties with lower wages, were not in county seats, and were in more in more populous cities.
Finally, independent newspapers were more likely to switch a¢ liations than partisan ones. These newspapers often
started out as independents and then, after 1-2 years of operation, became a¢ liated with one of the two major
political parties.
26Kaplan (2002), Starr (2004), Ayer (1881-1886).
27For example, there could be that a new newspaper called the Chronicle Herald was created and that two newspapers called the
Chronicle and the Herald ceased to exist. This might constitute a merger, but we cannot be sure without historical evidence from
other sources.
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4.4 Methodology and empirical results
Advertising and media independence, xed e¤ects
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relationship between the local protability of advertising and newspapersinde-
pendence. To test this hypothesis, I estimate the following xed e¤ects model:
Pr(indit = 1) = 0 + 1Ait +Xit2 + c + t + it (1)
Here Ait is some proxy for the local protability of advertising, computed for the newspaper i in year t. Xit is
a vector of controls for newspaper i in year t, c is a county dummy variable, and t is a time dummy variable.
Control variables Xit consists of time-varying county characteristics, including income, county population, electoral
returns in the last presidential and congressional elections, and city-specic variables, including city population
and a dummy for the city being a county seat. To estimate equation (1), I use a linear probability model.28
I use local circulation-adjusted advertising rates (the ratio of the newspapers advertising rate to its circulation)
to construct a proxy for the protability of advertising, Ait. For the benchmark model, I use an average circulation-
adjusted advertising rate computed for a city. Circulations are logged because otherwise the distribution of the
corresponding variable would be substantially skewed to the left.
Table 3 contains the results of my estimation of equation (1). The coe¢ cient for A in column 1, which
is signicant, implies that a single standard deviation increase in the local protability of advertising made local
newspapers 2.4 percentage points (p.p.) more likely to be independent in a given year. This e¤ect seems small, but
if multiplied over time as local advertising rates grow, it can explain a signicant part of the massive transformation
of newspapers in the United States in 1870-1920 from mainly partisan to main independent. For example, the in-
sample calculations imply that within-county growth of advertising rates explains 32% of the growth of independent
newspapers from 1881 to 1886.29
28However, the results of estimating the xed-e¤ect conditional logit are consistent with the results of xed-e¤ects OLS, as discussed
in the robustness check section.
29To compute this number, for the regression sample I rst calculate the growth of average circulation-adjusted A after controlling
for county xed e¤ects between 1881 and 1886 (the actual number is 1.90%). Then, I express this di¤erence in terms of within-county
standard deviations of A (68% of one standard deviation of A). Next, the implied growth for independent newspapers is computed,
using the coe¢ cient estimate from column 1 in Table 5 (0.62%), and compared with the observed in-sample growth (1.89%). I conclude
that the growth in adjusted advertising rates explains 32% of the total growth of independent newspapers based on within-sample
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Column 2 presents the results of estimating model (1) with newspaper xed e¤ects.30 The coe¢ cient implies
that the marginal e¤ect is similar in magnitude to the e¤ect in columns 1.
The main drawback of the specications discussed so far is potential endogeneity, because independent newspa-
pers, on average, might have higher advertising revenue per reader than partisan newspapers.31 Also, in the same
market (city) advertising rates of newspapers may be best responses to each others advertising price. One way to
solve this problem is to compute local protability of advertising using the circulation-adjusted advertising rate of
all newspapers in the city except this one. Column 3 reports this specication. Using this method, the e¤ect of a
single standard deviation change in A is slightly less than the magnitudes shown in the previous columns.32
Another potential solution would be to predict average circulation-adjusted advertising rates in this city by
the average adjusted advertising rates in other cities in a county, or in other counties in a state. The idea is
that advertising rates in this city should be positively correlated with advertising rates in other cities in a county
because of common trends, but that advertising rates in other markets could not be a basis for a best response for
newspapers in this market.33 The results using other cities in a county are presented in column 4. The magnitude
of the e¤ect is quite large as compared with all of the previous estimates. The results of the corresponding OLS
regression for the same sample are shown in column 5. Similarly, column 6 shows IV estimation in which the
advertising rate is predicted by advertising rates in other counties in a state; column 7 shows the corresponding
OLS specication. The directions and magnitudes of the e¤ects are similar. In both column 5 and column 7, the
e¤ect in the OLS estimation is almost half that of the corresponding IV estimation.34
estimates. The low rate of average growth of advertising rates between 1881 and 1886 could be explained, among other things, by the
nancial crisis of 1884.
30The specications that include newspaper xed e¤ects focus on switching between partisan and independent political a¢ liation.
Therefore, this paper also is related to the literature on the choice of formats, format switching, and the costs of repositioning.
Sweeting (2007) estimates the costs of switching in the radio industry. Berry and Waldfogel (2001) and Sweeting (2006) analyze how
the ownership of radio stations a¤ects variety and listenership.
31Statistically, however, there is no signicant relationship between newspapers own circulation-adjusted advertising rate and news-
papers political a¢ liation (see the results in Table 17).
32One potential explanation is larger measurement error in this specication. If the regressions in columns 2 and 3 are weighted by
the number of observations per city used to compute A, then the e¤ects of advertising equal 3.7 p.p. and 3.2 p.p., instead of 3.0 p.p.
and 2.2 p.p., correspondingly.
33This method follows Nevo (2001) and Chintagunta et al. (2006), who use advertising prices in other markets as instruments for
advertising price in a given market, to avoid the endogeneity problem of within-market estimates.
34A probable explanation for this discrepancy is measurement error.
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The coe¢ cients on average wage and average agricultural income are mostly negative but not signicant. This
could imply that the e¤ect of advertising emerges simply because of collinearity between these variables and the
protability of advertising. However, these coe¢ cients both remain negative, even if the protability of advertising
is excluded from the regression (results not reported). So, it is unlikely that the collinearity of advertising rates and
average income variables drives all of the results. Most likely, the income variables are negative and insignicant
in this context because we control for county xed e¤ects that capture most of the cross-county income di¤erences.
Once county and state xed e¤ects are excluded (see column 8), the controls for average agricultural income and
county census population become positive and signicant, more in line with the general intuition of Gentzkow et
al. (2006). In column 8, the coe¢ cient for advertising remains positive and signicant, and has approximately
the same magnitude as the corresponding coe¢ cient in columns 1-3. In all specications except the last one, the
joint p-value for the F-statistics of voting variables is higher than 0.2, so it is unlikely that changes in the political
preferences of a population drove an increase in newspaper independence.
Overall, the results of Table 3 can be summarized as follows: local protability of advertising had a signicant
positive e¤ect on the probability that a given newspaper was independent. A single standard deviation change in
the local protability of advertising led to a 2.2 p.p. to 5.8 p.p. increase in the probability of being independent,
depending on the specication. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Advertising and media independence, entry of new newspapers
To test Hypothesis 1a, I estimate equation (1) for the subsample of new newspapers. The hypothesis is that new
newspapers were more likely to choose being independent in counties with higher local advertising protability
A. Table 4 shows the results of this analysis.35 Column 1 presents a baseline model with the average circulation-
adjusted advertising rate computed for all newspapers in a county excluding this particular newspaper. The
magnitude of the e¤ect is similar to those obtained before: a 2.7 p.p. increase in the probability of starting as
an independent newspaper following a one standard deviation increase in the local circulation-adjusted advertising
rate. Column 2 has similar results with the average circulation-adjusted advertising rate being computed for all
newspapers in a county. Column 3 shows that the e¤ect remains positive and signicant even if we take the lag of
local advertising protability rather than its present value, but the magnitude of the e¤ect decreases to 1.9 p.p.
35Note that the number of observations per county does not permit me to estimate a specication with county xed e¤ects, so state
e¤ects are used instead, and the average protability of advertising is computed on the county level.
15
Overall, the results shown in Table 4 imply that in places with higher local advertising rates, new newspapers
were more likely to enter the market as independents. A single standard deviation change in the local protability
of advertising led to 1.9 p.p. to 5.8 p.p. increase in the probability of being independent, depending on the
specication. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
4.4.1 Advertising and media independence, IV estimation
One potential drawback of the results in Table 3 is that newspaper independence may be driven by some time-
varying unobserved heterogeneity on the county or city level, e.g. unobserved change in political preferences of
people who were becoming richer. To deal with this, I present evidence that this was not the case for Massachusetts.
My evidence is based on instrumental variable estimation, in which di¤erent regulations related to advertising
instrument for the protability of advertising on the city level.
For this part of the analysis, I collected data on local ordinances regulating outdoor advertising and newspaper
and handbill distribution. For each city for which I was able to nd data,36 I recorded whether it had legal
restrictions on these activities in a given year. I only use sources that indicate when a particular piece of legislation
was adopted. (My list of sources is given in Table A1.) Most of these regulations stated that outdoor advertising
or handbill distribution required permission of the mayor or city council, or that there be a license for outdoor
advertising. Some also regulated the size of advertising placards and their position on the street, or whether the
distribution of newspapers, circulars, or advertising handbills in the streets was allowed.
Why would these regulations a¤ect the local protability of advertising? Outdoor advertising was the main
competitor of newspaper advertising, so any restriction on outdoor advertising should increase the attractiveness
of newspaper advertising for all newspapers, both partisan and independent alike. In contrast, the restrictions on
handbill and newspaper distribution should decrease the protability of newspaper advertising for all newspapers.
Table 5, which shows raw correlations between the main variables, conrms this intuition about the signs of these
coe¢ cients.
The exclusion restriction can be violated if the regulations that encourage newspaper advertising were adopted
as a response to lobbying from independent newspapers which beneted most from these regulations. There are at
least two arguments against this story, though. First, a wave of these ordinances was triggered by a scandal involving
the advertisement of a patent medicine, S T 1860 X," which was painted on a rock near Niagara Falls (Taylor
36 I mostly use Widener Library and the Rare Manuscript Collection of the Law School Library at Harvard University.
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and Chang, 1995) an event plausibly orthogonal to the development of an independent press in Massachusetts.
Second, it is not clear whether the partisan newspapers had any incentives to lobby against outdoor advertising
regulations and for newspaper distribution regulations, which were harmful for them as well. 37
Table 6 presents the results of rst stage estimation.38 The last row shows that the instruments used are quite
strong: the F-statistics for instruments is never less than 16.07. The coe¢ cients for both types of advertising
regulations have the predicted sign: they are jointly signicant at least at the 5% level and are individually
signicant in all columns except column 6.39
Table 7 shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) with IV and OLS for the same sample. I use as
instruments either the two regulations together or each regulation separately. A single standard deviation increase
in local advertising protability raises the probability that the newspaper was independent by 44 p.p. to 73 p.p. for
the di¤erent estimates. The IV coe¢ cients are larger than the OLS coe¢ cients, probably because of measurement
error. The results of the Hansen over-identication test for the specication with two instruments (reported in the
last row of Table 7) suggest that the instruments used are valid. Note that for the sample with Boston, the standard
deviation of circulation-adjusted advertising rates is approximately 7 times larger than the corresponding standard
deviation computed for the sample without Boston.40 This di¤erence can explain the discrepancy between these
results and those in Table 3. In columns 5-8, which show the results without Boston, the e¤ects of one standard
deviation change in A are reduced to 6.0 p.p. to 9.6 p.p. for the di¤erent estimates, are much closer to the numbers
in Table 3.41
37 If we assume that preferences of partisan newspapers were aligned in this respect, which was probably true, this implies that in
places with more partisan newspapers and better connections with local politicians, these regulations  protable for all newspapers
should be adopted earlier, not later than in places with more independent newspapers. This line of reasoning is similar to Kroszner
and Strahan (1999) and Benmelech and Moskowitz (2008), who argue that regulations were adopted (cancelled) earlier in places where
there were powerful interests that supported (opposed) these regulations.
38Results are reported separately for the sample with and without Boston newspapers (Boston is an outlier in this exercise).
39The absolute value of the point estimate for the regulation of handbill distribution is larger than the point estimate for the regulation
of outdoor advertising. It implies that the regulation of handbill distribution, which in fact restricted newspaper distribution, was
relatively more important for newspaper advertising than for the regulation of outdoor advertising, its competitor.
40Numerical values are 0.105 without Boston and 0.706 with Boston.
41 In column 8 the coe¢ cient for advertising in the specication with only one instrument computed for the sample without Boston
is positive but not signicant, but it is still larger than its standard error. This probably happens because of the smaller sample (128
data points without Boston newspapers vs. 179 points with Boston newspapers). I also checked the alternative specication, in which
the main variable of interest is the local advertising rate not adjusted by circulation, and logged circulation is included as a control
(results not reported). In that specication, the coe¢ cient for local average advertising rates is positive and signicant at the 10%
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Overall, the results of IV estimation reported in Table 7 provide evidence of a causal relationship between the
local protability of advertising and the newspapers independence, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1.
4.4.2 Newspapers and parties: a political channel
This paper not only presents evidence in favor of an economic explanation of the commercialization of the news
and the development of independent press but also is consistent with political economy considerations behind this
development. It implies that a model focused only on economic development42 cannot explain the whole story.
The data are consistent with the hypothesis that political parties had some control over the partisan newspapers.
First, the results in Table 3 and 4 imply that the newspapers in county seats, cities which were richer and
provided more opportunities for political patronage, were less likely to be independent. On average, county seats
were more developed and more populous cities than non-county seats, and they should have more independent
newspapers, according to the results of Gentzkow et al. (2006) and Hamilton (2004). However, it was easier for
political parties to subsidize partisan newspapers in these places (Baldasty 1992). The corresponding coe¢ cients
in Table 3 and Table 4 imply that the e¤ect of being located in a county seat is similar in magnitude to the e¤ect
of a single standard deviation change in A.43
The second piece of evidence comes from the year xed e¤ects. To save space, most of the tables in the paper do
not show year xed e¤ects, but they are presented in Table 8. As we can see, the years in which the newspapers were
less likely to be independent were 1880 and 1884, both Presidential elections years, when it was more important
for political parties to have partisan newspapers. The pure economic story would say that independent newspapers
should grow faster following years of economic growth. The real growth of the American economy was faster in
1880-81 than in later years. In 1879, real GDP in 2000 dollars was equal to $156.9; in 1880 it was $169.9; in 1881
it was $191.1. From 1882 to 1885, it gradually increased from $201.3 to $204.1.44 The years of fastest economic
growth, therefore, were 1880 and 1881. At the same time, there were signicantly fewer independent newspapers
in 1880 and 1884, which is more consistent with a political story.
Overall, this evidence might explain why the growth of the advertising market need not guarantee the growth of
level.
42E.g. Besley and Prat (2006), Gabsewitz et al. (2001, 2002), Gentzkow et al. (2006), Hamilton (2004).
43These two variables together explain 81.5% of within-county variation in newspaper independence in specication (1) in Table 3
(62.1% in specication (1) in Table 4 for the entry of newly created newspapers).
44Source: Louis D. Johnston and Samuel H. Williamson, "What Was the U.S. GDP Then?" MeasuringWorth, 2008.
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press independence. If politiciansincentives to intervene in media markets are strong enough, they will undermine
the positive e¤ect of economic development on media freedom. The theoretical underpinnings of this e¤ect are
analyzed in Gehlbach and Sonin (2008) and Petrova (2009)
Circulation and media independence
Hypothesis 2 implies that the politically centrist newspapers, or independent newspapers, had a larger audience
than those with a political a¢ liation. To test this hypothesis, I estimate the following equation:
circit = 0 + 1indit +Xit3 + c + t + it (2)
where circit is the circulation of a newspaper i in year t, logged, and indit is the dummy for being an independent
newspaper. The vector of controls includes the same county-level and city-level variables as in previous models.
Table 9 reports the results for model (2), for the entire sample of newspapers and separately for the daily
newspapers only. Columns 1-4 show the results of the OLS estimates with county xed e¤ects. Column 1 shows
that for the sample of all newspapers, circulation was not signicantly associated with political a¢ liation. How-
ever, actually columns 2 and 3 show that the e¤ect of being independent was negative and signicant for weekly
newspapers, and positive and signicant for daily newspapers. The latter result is consistent with Hypothesis 2,
while the result for weeklies implies that, on average, weekly independent newspapers had lower circulation than
partisan weeklies. Column 4 shows that for dailies in cities with more than 10000 population the positive e¤ect of
being independent was even stronger. This explains why scholars writing on the subject45 claimed that independent
newspapers had larger circulations, because they looked only at dailies in the biggest cities like New York, Boston,
and Philadelphia.
Note that the specications in columns 1-4 do not allow for including controls in the most exible way, but it
might be that the relationship between the circulation and control variables is non-linear. One way to solve this
problem is to use a matching estimator, which compares the circulation of an independent newspaper with the
circulation of a partisan newspaper located close to the rst newspaper in a parameter space.46 Column 5 and
column 6 show the results of this estimation. As one can see that for all newspapers the e¤ect of being independent
45Baldasty (1992), Douglas (1999), Starr (2004).
46 I use nearest neighbor matching procedure of Abadie et al. (2004).
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is negative and signicant, while for dailies the corresponding e¤ect is positive and signicant. So, these results
are consistent with the previous ndings.47
Overall, the results of Table 9 suggest that among dailies, independent newspapers, on average, had larger
circulation, and this was why they chose to be independent, as discussed in Baldasty (1992), Gentzkow et al.
(2006), and Starr (2004). However, the same was not true for weeklies, for whom the e¤ect of being an independent
newspaper was negative and signicant Some other mechanism, either market expansion and variety or the existence
of private benets of control, can explain the relationship between the growth of advertising and the growth of
independent newspapers for weeklies.
4.5 Alternative explanations and robustness checks
Non-linear relationship between advertising rates and circulation
Throughout the paper, I used advertising rate adjusted by circulation as the key independent variable. The
theoretical justication for this choice of a functional form is that corresponding models use advertising revenue
per reader as the main variable of interest (Besley and Prat, 2006, Gabszewicz et al., 2001, Gentzkow et al., 2006,
Petrova, 2009). However, if the underlying relationship between advertising revenues and circulation is non-linear,
then some of the results could be driven by the relationship between circulation and independence. I checked if the
results of the paper, summarized in Table 3 and Table 7, still hold if the main variable of interest is an unadjusted
local average advertising rate and if we control for logged circulation. In all specications, the sign of the variable of
interest remains positive, and the level of signicance remains the same or increases. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 10
present the results of another robustness check with newspaper xed e¤ects and average advertising rate computed
for all newspapers excluding this one, and controlling either for logged circulation or for a polynomial function of
circulation raised from 1/2 to 1/5 degree. As we can see, the results are similar.
Third variable explanation
The results in Table 3 show that independent newspapers ourished in counties with the fastest growth of
47One problem with Table 9 is that it ignores the market structure. In the markets with more than one newspaper, the market
structure and the populations distribution of preferences could play a role. Note that all specications in Table 9 control for the
number of newspapers in a city, as a proxy for competition. I also test Hypothesis 2 in monopolistic markets, for the subsample
of newspapers located in one-newspaper cities. The results (not reported) show that being independent had a positive e¤ect on a
newspapers circulation in one-newspaper cities for dailies, but this e¤ect becomes negative and insignicant for weeklies.
20
advertising rates. However, besides the direct e¤ect of advertising, there may be some other explanations for
these results. The coe¢ cients for local advertising rates may imply the existence of some third variable that
simultaneously causes advertising rates and media independence to grow. County or city xed e¤ects do not solve
this problem. The main answer to a pure third variable explanation is the IV results for Massachusetts that are
reported in Table 7. For robustness checks, though, I conduct other tests as well.
First, I control for all available important city/county characteristics interacted with year dummies. I also
include base year circulation interacted with year dummies. The corresponding results are presented in columns
3 and 4 of Table 10. As we can see, the coe¢ cients for circulation-adjusted advertising rates remain positive and
signicant at the 5% level, even if all control variables48 are interacted with year dummies.49
Second, I use the matching technique, conditional on observables. In particular, I divide the whole sample into
two large groups: newspapers located in cities with average advertising rates above and below the median value in
a state. I use nearest neighbor covariate matching (Abadie et al. 2004), and exact matching by state and year, so
the matching algorithm nds the nearest neighbor in the same state. The results of this exercise, shown in Table
11, are consistent with Table 3.
Changing political preferences
One alternative explanation of the results in Table 3 is that in counties with the fastest growth of advertising
rates, political preferences were becoming more centrist; and, as a result, people increasingly preferred reading
independent newspapers. This should not necessarily be reected in the electoral returns, which are included as
controls.
To address this issue, I use the data on roll call votes as a proxy for the preferences of the electorate.50 In theory,
roll call votes in Congress reect the individual preferences of the members of Congress, the preferences of their party
and special interest groups, and the preferences of their constituency. If we assume that the preferences of parties
and special interest groups remained relatively constant over these 6 years and, more importantly, geographically,
then changes in the pattern of roll call votes corresponded to changes in the preferences of their constituency, plus
some noise. As a measure of the preferences of the members of Congress, I use NOMINATE data from Poole and
48The exception is electoral controls, which exhibit natural variation over time.
49However, the e¤ects of a single standard deviation increase in circulation-adjusted advertising rate are quantitatively lower than
the corresponding numbers in column 4 of Table 5 (from 2.2 p.p. in Table 3 to approximately 1.7 p.p. in Table 10). This could be the
case because the results of columns 3-4 in Table 10 are estimated using a di¤erent sample.
50 I am grateful to Jim Snyder for this suggestion.
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Rosenthal (1997) who estimate the parameters of the spatial model of voting, including the ideal points, from the
observed record of roll call votes.
According to Poole and Rosenthal, during the 1880s the rst dimension of the NOMINATE score reected
the liberal-conservative, Republican-Democratic split, while the second dimension reected the conict between
urban and rural interests, North vs. South and far West. In order to test the hypothesis that the preferences of
constituencies were becoming more centrist in counties with the fastest growth of advertising rates and independent
newspapers, I created a measure of legislator bias. This was computed as the absolute value of the deviation from
the median for the corresponding dimension of the NOMINATE score. Table 12 shows the results of the estimation.
Computed on the basis of the rst dimension of NOMINATE, legislator bias was not signicantly correlated with
lower advertising rates or a lower fraction of independent newspapers. For the second dimension of NOMINATE,
legislator bias was signicantly higher in districts with a larger fraction of independent newspapers. This is not
consistent with the hypothesis that legislators were becoming more centrist in such districts. Also, legislator bias
was signicantly lower in districts with a larger fraction of Democratic newspapers.
I also checked whether the results of Table 3 were not signicantly a¤ected by the inclusion of NOMINATE
scores as control variables (columns 1 and 2 of Table 16). I nd that the results are generally consistent, although
the level of signicance of advertising variables changes in a couple of the specications. Overall, the evidence in
Table 12 is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the preferences of the constituency, proxied by the NOMINATE
scores, were becoming more centrist in counties with the fastest growth of both circulation-adjusted advertising
rates and independent newspapers.
Migration and African-Americans
Another potential explanation for the results in Table 3 is migration. It could be that the counties with faster
protability growth in advertising and, correspondingly, faster population growth were counties with a larger inow
of immigrants who were not interested in partisan politics and preferred to read independent newspapers. Table
13 shows how aggregate newspaper characteristics and voting outcomes in a county depended on the fraction of
foreign-born individuals in the total population. Immigration was not associated with a higher local advertising
rate or a higher fraction of independent newspapers. The fraction of Republican newspapers was larger in places
with more immigrants, consistent with the fact that the Republican party represented the interests of a foreign-
born constituency during that time period.51 Similarly, there is no indication that the changes in the fraction of
51Note that these results are consistent with the ndings of McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) that immigrants increase, not
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African-Americans in the population caused advertising rates and independent newspapers to grow (Table 14).
The coe¢ cients for African American population in the models with advertising rate or independent newspapers
as dependent variables (columns 1-3 in Table 14) have di¤erent signs and are insignicant. Overall, the results in
Tables 13 and 14 are inconsistent with the proposed alternative explanation.52
I also checked the results of Table 3 for robustness to the inclusion of the fraction of immigrants or the frac-
tion of African-Americans in the regressions (results not reported). In that exercise, the coe¢ cients for A were
approximately the same magnitude and remained signicant at the 1% signicance level.
Changing political competition
It could also be the case that changing political competition in a county can explain the coevolution of advertising
rates and the independence of local newspapers. For example, an increase in political competition can increase the
demand for independent newspapers as voters, in order to be able to make an informed choice, increasingly will
prefer to have less biased information about politicians from di¤erent parties. At the same time, advertising rates
might go up as places with growing political competition might be growing economically as well. Alternatively,
growing political competition might increase the competition between newspapers; this, in turn, could drive local
advertising rates down. At the same time, the number of independent newspapers also might decline as the parties
become more interested in inuencing newspapers.
To test these alternative explanations, I use data on vote margins as a proxy for political competition in a county.
Vote margins are computed as the absolute value of di¤erences between the vote for Democrats and Republicans
in a county. Smaller vote margins, by assumption, correspond to more political competition. Table 15 presents the
results of estimating model (1) with vote margins added as a control. These results are consistent with the ndings
of Table 3.
Other robustness checks
In addition to specication (1), we may want to take into account the size of the audience for independent
newspapers. Newspapers with a larger audience could be more inuential. Therefore, all specications in Table
3 can be estimated with weights proportional to the newspaperscirculation. The results of this estimation (not
reported) are consistent with Table 3: coe¢ cients for all measures of A remain signicant at the 1% level, and
the marginal e¤ects of a single standard deviation change in A remain similar in magnitude. Also, I estimate the
decrease, the polarization of the electorate for the later period.
52Note that these results are consistent with the ndings of Hamilton (2004).
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same set of specications using the share of circulation of independent newspapers as a dependent variable. All
observations in this exercise are weighted with frequency weights. The results remain consistent with Table 3, and
the coe¢ cients for all measures of A retain their sign and level of signicance. Finally, I estimate the e¤ect of
circulation-adjusted local advertising rates in a collapsed dataset in which the unit of observation is city-year, and
the share of circulation of independent newspapers is a dependent variable. These results are consistent with the
basic specications in Table 3.
I also estimate model (1) with a dummy for Democratic or Republican newspapers as the dependent variable,
to be sure that the e¤ect of advertising works di¤erently for partisan newspapers. The e¤ect of the local advertising
rate on the probability of being a Democratic newspaper is negative and signicant. A similar e¤ect for Republican
newspapers is also negative, but stops being signicant after the inclusion of newspaper xed e¤ects. These results
suggest that the growth in local advertising rates stimulated the growth of independent newspapers, but not that
of partisan newspapers.
In addition, I tested whether the relationship between local advertising rates and a newspapers independence
still holds for data collapsed by city, because otherwise the results could be attributable to complex patterns of
correlation between newspapers interacting within the same market. The results are consistent with Table 3.
Unfortunately, I was not able to nd education or literacy data on a county level for that time period. In the
ICPSR dataset, Census data for literacy are available on a state level only for 1880 and 1900. Moreover, the Census
of 1880 reports if people over age ten could read, while the Census of 1900 reports the percentage of literate males
over age 21, so it is not clear how to construct a single variable capturing literacy in 1880-1900. However, I checked
that my results are robust to the inclusion of stateyear xed e¤ects. This would imply that my results are also
robust to the inclusion of any state-level literacy index based on interpolation of the 1880 and 1900 variables.
Finally, I checked whether my results still hold when Southern states are excluded. The coe¢ cients for adver-
tising rates remain positive and signicant and are similar in magnitude even for the specication with newspaper
xed e¤ects. This suggests that my results are not driven by some kind of sample selection. However, if only
Southern states are included in the sample, then only coe¢ cients in specications with newspaper xed e¤ects
remain positive and signicant. The weaker results for Southern states may be explained by their peculiar political
structure and the lack of political competition. Independent newspapers in the South in fact could be sponsored
by a non-dominant party and, therefore, be similar to partisan newspapers in the North.
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5 Conclusion
In the middle of the 19th century, most U.S. newspapers were partisan, just like many media outlets all over the
world in the beginning of the 21st century. Sponsored by political parties, they represented the interests of the
politicians in their news and editorials. However, between 1865 and 1920, however, U.S. newspapers experienced
a great transformation, from being overwhelmingly partisan to being mostly independent. What accounts for this
transformation? And, which conditions made it possible? These questions have no unambiguous answer in the
literature.
Although economic arguments have been discussed, there have been few attempts to nd systematic empirical
evidence for the claim that market conditions, and in particular the growth of newspaper advertising, explain the
political independence of the media. In this paper, I present such evidence using data on American newspapers in
the1880s. Newspapersindependence was positively related to the local protability of advertising. In the areas
with a faster growing advertising market, newspapers were more likely to be independent. The e¤ect of advertising
worked both through the entry of new newspapers and through changes in the a¢ liation of existing newspapers.
The results of IV estimation suggest that the direction of causality goes from the protability of advertising to
independence, not vice versa.
Additionally, the circulation of independent daily newspapers was, on average, higher than the circulation of
similar partisan newspapers. This suggests that formal independence was economically protable for dailies. For
weeklies, though, the circulation of independent newspapers was lower than the circulation of similar partisan
newspapers. Probably some alternative mechanism, such as the e¤ect of market expansion or the existence of
private benets of control, can explain the e¤ect of the protability of advertising in this case.
Why was newspaper independence important, after all? Dyck et al. (2008) show that publications in "muck-
raking" magazines restricted the relative importance of special interest groups for policymakers, thus promoting
the adoption of progressive era legislation. Gentzkow et al. (2006) perform a content analysis for news on major
corruption scandals; they show that the content of newspapers was becoming less biased and more objective as the
number of independent newspapers was increasing and the extent of corruption was decreasing. The theoretical
results of Strömberg (2004a and 2004b) suggest why this could be the case. The growth of advertising markets
increased the relative importance of large groups of the population for media outlets. Media outlets all over the
country were more likely to break their ties with parties and become, at least formally, independent. Indepen-
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dent media outlets on average provided more objective coverage for larger groups of population. As a result, the
preferences of ordinary citizens, who became more informed about politics, mattered more for policymakers.
The results in this paper suggest that the expansion of advertising markets gave newspapers an opportunity
to become independent of political inuence in their decision making. These results might also hold for modern
developing countries and have implications for policymaking there. It is not clear whether these historical results
could easily be extended for specic modern countries. Further empirical and experimental research is needed to
determine whether these results hold as well for other times and places.
Finally, my results also imply that the ongoing nancial crisis, and an associated decrease in advertising revenues,
create a threat for media independence. Another direction for future research is to look at whether newspapers are
becoming more partisan in their content during this crisis, either in the United States or in other countries.
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Note: Tables 10-17 are intended to be published as on-line appendix. 
 
Table 1 . Summary statistics for newspaper variables.  
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Independent newspaper (dummy) 24168 .249 .432 0 1 
Republican  newspaper (dummy) 24168 .3765 .4842 0 1 
Democratic  newspaper (dummy) 24168 .3768 .4843 0 1 
Advertising rate (plain) 24039 2.816 3.350 .5 93.6 
Circulation-adjusted advertising rate 22639 .388 .334 .063 7.927 
Circulation (logged) 22749 6.885 .723 3.912 12.038 
Daily newspaper (dummy) 24161 .097 .296 0 1 
Year of establishment 18464 1868.6 15.36 1773 1885 
Sources: Ayer’s directory of newspapers 1881-1886. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics for city- and county-level variables. All newspaper variables are collapsed by city or county 
in corresponding panels 
Panel A.  City-level variables 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
City population 14918 7.255 1.157 4.143 13.650 
County seat (dummy) 14918 0.480 0.500 0 1 
Circulation-adjusted advertising rate 14918 0.352 0.161 0.067 3.851 
Fraction of independent newspapers 14918 0.276 0.414 0 1 
Fraction of Republican newspapers 14918 0.359 0.406 0 1 
Fraction of Democratic newspapers 14918 0.365 0.414 0 1 
Number of newspapers 14918 1.518 0.996 1 22 
 
Panel B. County-level variables 
Variable Observations 
 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Total population, county 10265 25653.7 44837.8 214 967046 
Urban population, county 10265 0.028 0.129 0 1 
Fraction of African-American population 10265 0.145 0.225 0 1.352 
Fraction of foreign-born population 10265 0.129 0.177 0 2.826 
Vote for Democratic candidates,  
Congress elections 
9941 49.544 22.868 0 100 
Vote for Republican candidates,  
Congress elections 
9939 39.577 22.844 0 100 
Vote for Greenback candidates,  
Congress elections 
9947 2.660 8.974 0 83.3 
Vote for other candidates,  
Congress elections 
9957 2.770 8.694 0 98.1 
Turnout, Congress elections 9880 68.233 22.207 0 607.4 
Vote for Democratic candidates,  
Congress elections 
10026 50.091 16.849 0 100 
Vote for Republican candidates,  
Presidential elections 
10026 46.034 16.208 0 95.7 
Vote for Greenback candidates,  
Presidential elections 
10026 2.765 5.559 0 50.6 
Vote for other candidates,  
Presidential elections 
10026 1.099 3.191 0 62 
Turnout, Presidential elections 9979 74.845 18.598 10.600 371 
Nominate score, 1
st
  dimension 12839 -0.095 0.417 -0.757 0.828 
Nominate score, 2
nd
 dimension 12839 0.045 0.143 -0.417 0.389 
Legislator Bias, based on 1
st
 dimension 
of Nominate score 
12839 0.369 0.250 0 1.082 
Legislator Bias, based on 2
nd
 dimension 
of Nominate score 
12839 0.569 0.398 0 1.217 
Fraction of independent newspapers 11272 0.210 0.300 0 1 
Fraction of Republican newspapers 11272 0.331 0.350 0 1 
Fraction of Democratic newspapers 11272 0.459 0.401 0 1 
Fraction of daily newspapers 11270 0.072 0.196 0 1 
Local average circulation-adjusted 
advertising rate  
10786 0.385 0.188 0.076 2.822 
Local average advertising rate 11242 2.616 1.547 0.500 26.885 
Number of newspapers in county 11272 2.887 2.577 1 41 
 
Source: Ayer’s directory of newspapers 1881-1886; “Electoral Data for Counties in the United States: Presidential and Congressional Races, 1840-
1972”, ICPSR study 8611; “Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2000”, Census data reconstructed by 
Michael Haines; ICPSR study 2896; Poole and Rosenthal D-NOMINATE data for from http://www.voteview.com. City population is taken from Ayer’s 
directory (which reproduced it from Census 1880).  Maximum city population is larger than maximum county population (panel B) as these two 
variables come from different sources and treat New York City differently. 
 
Note:  Some turnout figures are higher than 100% probably because of election fraud (turnout figures of that period are discussed e.g. in Argersinger, P. 
H. (1985) “New Perspectives on Election Fraud in the Gilded Age.” Political Science Quarterly, 100, pp. 669-87). For all election returns, observations 
with error code 999.9% were replaced with missing values. 
Table 3. Profitability of advertising and newspaper circulation. Basic results. 
 Dummy for independent newspaper 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Local circulation-adjusted  0.0770** 0.0946*** 0.0668*** 0.217*** 0.104** 0.221*** 0.105*** 0.0849*** 
advertising rate (A) [0.0371] [0.0291] [0.0213] [0.0437] [0.0490] [0.0832] [0.0262] [0.0266] 
Method of computing A 
Average A 
for all 
newspapers 
in a city 
Average A 
for all 
newspapers 
in a city 
Average A for all 
newspapers in a 
city, excluding this 
newspaper 
Average A for all 
newspapers in a city, 
instrumented by 
average A in other cities 
in a county 
Average A for all 
newspapers in a city, 
computed for the same 
sample as IV regression in 
previous column 
Average A for all 
newspapers in a city, 
instrumented by 
average A in other 
cities in a county 
Average A for all 
newspapers in a city, 
computed for the same 
sample as IV regression 
in previous column 
Average A 
for all 
newspapers 
in a city 
Effect of one standard 
deviation change in A (in %) 
2.02 3.03 2.21 5.70 2.74 5.81 2.77 2.23 
Fixed effects 
County, 
Year 
Newspaper, 
Year 
Newspaper, Year County, Year County, Year State, Year State, Year Year 
Log (county population) 0.018 0.03 0.036 -0.036 -0.030 0.0879*** 0.0946*** 0.070*** 
 [0.063] [0.075] [0.076] [0.107] [0.085] [0.009] [0.017] [0.016] 
Log (average wage in -0.034 -0.028 -0.030 -0.040 -0.039 -0.0358*** -0.0357*** -0.044*** 
manufacture) [0.022] [0.024] [0.024] [0.042] [0.034] [0.005] [0.011] [0.010] 
Log (average agricultural  -0.032 -0.031 -0.034 -0.010 -0.017 0.011 0.010 0.030** 
income per family) [0.041] [0.048] [0.049] [0.070] [0.054] [0.008] [0.016] [0.013] 
Dummy for city being  -0.218***   -0.225*** -0.228*** -0.160*** -0.165*** -0.177*** 
a county seat [0.018]   [0.009] [0.018] [0.007] [0.013] [0.013] 
Log (city population) -0.106***   -0.110*** -0.107*** -0.056*** -0.0514*** -0.041*** 
 [0.012]   [0.005] [0.012] [0.005] [0.008] [0.007] 
Number of newspapers in  0.009 0.001 0.0006 0.0042 0.009 -0.009** -0.0021 0.0001 
A city (proxy for competition) [0.007] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.00448] [0.003] [0.003] 
F-statistics for electoral 
controls 
1.262 0.757 0.785 2.82 0.813 2.57 
2.62 
 
7.737 
Observations 24168 15224 15224 16323 16323 24168 24168 24168 
R-squared 0.35 0.92 0.92 0.05 0.31 0.14 0.15 0.12 
N of cities 3444 1472 1472 2602 2602 3444 3444 3444 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by city level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Note: Electoral controls include percentage of votes for Republicans, Democrats, Greenbacks, and other parties in the most recent presidential and congressional elections, and voter turnout in these elections. 
Data on population and income are from U.S. Census 1880 and 1890, interpolated for 1881-1886.  Newspaper data and data on city population are from Ayer‘s American Newspaper Annual (1881-1886). 
Electoral data are from Clubb et. al. (2006) dataset at ISPSR. Only Republican, Democratic, or independent newspapers are included in the sample. Data on county seats are from ICPSR 8159 dataset, 
constructed by R. Sechrist. In column (5) with IV specification χ2 statistics for electoral variables is reported instead of F-statistics. In all specifications, coefficients for circulation-adjusted advertising rates 
computed with fixed effect logit (not reported here) have the same or greater level of significance. 
    Note that the coefficient for city population is negative and highly significant, in contrast to findings of Gentzkow et al. (2006) and Hamilton (2004), that is, larger city population is negatively correlated 
with newspaper independence, once year fixed effects and county fixed effects are taken into account. Further tests (results not reported) imply, however, that this negative effect emerges when county fixed 
effects and income controls are included. In other words, the effect of city population is negative for within-county variation in newspaper independence, but is positive for between-county variation, if no 
fixed effects or electoral controls are included. The difference between the results of Gentzkow et al. (2006) and Hamilton (2004) and mine can be explained by the fact that they do not use them. 
  
    Table 4. Local advertising rates and entry of independent newspapers. Only newly created newspapers are included in the sample. 
 Dummy for independent newspaper 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Local circulation-adjusted advertising rate (A) 0.0920** 0.139*** 0.091** 
 [0.037] [0.047] [0.046] 
Method of computing A Average A for all newspapers in a 
county, excluding this newspaper 
Average A for all newspapers 
in a county 
Average A for all newspapers in a 
county, lagged 1 year 
Effect of one standard deviation change for given measure of 
A (in %) 
2.84 3.41 2.32 
Fixed effects State x Year State x Year State x Year 
Log (county population) 0.034 0.017 0.042 
 [0.030] [0.025] [0.028] 
Log (average wage in manufacture) 0.040 0.0445* 0.043* 
 [0.026] [0.023] [0.023] 
Log (average agricultural income per family) -0.087*** -0.069*** -0.067*** 
 [0.019] [0.015] [0.017] 
Dummy for city being a county seat -0.146*** -0.125*** -0.137*** 
 [0.022] [0.019] [0.020] 
Log (city population) -0.046*** -0.037*** -0.039*** 
 [0.012] [0.010] [0.010] 
Number of newspapers in a city (proxy for competition) -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 
 [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] 
F-statistics for electoral controls 2.645 3.074 2.836 
Observations 2704 3310 3023 
R-squared 0.189 0.174 0.175 
N of cities 1764 2143 1968 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by city. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Note: Electoral controls include percentage of votes for Republicans, Democrats, Greenbacks, and other parties in the most recent presidential and congressional elections, and voter turnout in these elections.  
Newspaper data and data on city population are from Ayer‘s American Newspaper Annual (1881-1886). Data on income and population are from U.S. Census 1880 and 1890 (reconstructed by Haines in 
2005), interpolated for 1881-1886. Electoral data are from Clubb et. al. (2006) dataset at ISPSR. Data on county seats are from ICPSR 8159 dataset, constructed by R. Sechrist. Only newly created Republican, 
Democratic, or independent newspapers are included in the sample.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Raw correlations, local advertising rates and advertising regulations. Massachusetts, 1881-1886 
 
Circulation-
adjusted 
advertising rate 
Regulation 
of outdoor 
advertising 
Regulation of 
handbill 
distribution 
City 
population 
(logged) 
County 
seat 
(dummy) 
Average 
wage 
(logged) 
Average 
agricultural 
income (logged) 
Independent 
newspaper 
Republican 
newspaper 
Democratic 
newspaper 
Circulation-adjusted 
advertising rate, 
local average 
1.0000           
Regulation of 
outdoor advertising 
0.5601 1.0000          
Regulation of 
handbill distribution 
-0.6032 -0.5721 1.0000        
City population 
(logged) 
0.8921 0.4828 -0.6551 1       
County seat 
(dummy) 
0.2887 -0.1641 -0.229 0.5268 1      
Average wage 
(logged) 
-0.6079 -0.5899 0.4987 -0.6779 0.0782 1     
Average agricultural 
income (logged) 
0.6132 0.6021 -0.5432 0.6168 -0.0825 -0.937 1    
Independent 
newspaper 
0.1931 -0.0266 -0.1334 0.1442 0.1833 0.0636 -0.0729 1   
Republican 
newspaper 
-0.2311 -0.0459 0.069 -0.2223 -0.1949 0.1089 -0.099 -0.6412 1  
Democratic 
newspaper 
0.0512 0.0858 0.0729 0.0976 0.0194 -0.2042 0.2033 -0.3985 -0.4482 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. First stage regression. Local advertising rates and advertising regulations.  
Massachusetts, 1881-1886. 
 Circulation-adjusted advertising rate, local average 
 Including Boston newspapers Excluding Boston newspapers 
Regulation of outdoor advertising 0.146***  0.0514* 0.152***  0.0556 
 [0.0292]  [0.0304] [0.0296]  [0.0356] 
Regulation of handbill distribution  -0.247*** -0.195**  -0.237*** -0.182** 
  [0.0573] [0.0751]  [0.0573] [0.0808] 
Vote for Democrats, -0.0110*** -0.0154*** -0.0140*** -0.00231 -0.00287 -0.00269 
congressional elections [0.00357] [0.00346] [0.00370] [0.00824] [0.00714] [0.00733] 
Vote for Republicans, -0.0129*** -0.0144*** -0.0139*** -0.0268 -0.0469 -0.0403 
congressional elections [0.00370] [0.00348] [0.00355] [0.0445] [0.0375] [0.0401] 
Vote for Greenbacks, -0.0592*** -0.0619*** -0.0605*** -0.0327 -0.0446 -0.041 
congressional elections [0.00519] [0.00459] [0.00475] [0.0367] [0.0332] [0.0339] 
Vote for other candidates, -0.0584*** -0.0558*** -0.0562*** -0.043 -0.0514 -0.0489 
congressional elections [0.00470] [0.00398] [0.00412] [0.0374] [0.0325] [0.0335] 
Voter turnout, 0.132*** 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.0906 0.116 0.109 
congressional elections [0.0145] [0.0141] [0.0144] [0.0979] [0.0834] [0.0861] 
Vote for Democrats, 2.617*** 1.253*** 1.628*** 3.136 4.575 4.019 
presidential elections [0.236] [0.245] [0.358] [4.836] [3.973] [4.201] 
Vote for Republicans, 2.529*** 1.146*** 1.523*** 3.06 4.398 3.874 
presidential elections [0.233] [0.249] [0.365] [4.695] [3.848] [4.068] 
Vote for Greenbacks, 2.595*** 1.282*** 1.645*** 3.074 4.481 3.941 
presidential elections [0.232] [0.237] [0.346] [4.697] [3.863] [4.083] 
Vote for other candidates, 2.619*** 1.108*** 1.514*** 3.103 4.321 3.829 
presidential elections [0.240] [0.273] [0.398] [4.759] [3.896] [4.111] 
Voter turnout, -0.226*** -0.263*** -0.259*** -0.164 -0.296 -0.26 
presidential elections [0.0174] [0.0208] [0.0222] [0.207] [0.183] [0.194] 
City population, logged 0.0819 -0.162 -0.127 0.0695 -0.163 -0.124 
 [0.0727] [0.124] [0.135] [0.0733] [0.126] [0.142] 
County-seat -0.0256 0.222 0.195 -0.0115 0.217 0.188 
 [0.0897] [0.146] [0.153] [0.0902] [0.147] [0.158] 
Average wage in manufacture, logged 0.954*** 0.959*** 0.957*** 0.758 1.128* 1.006 
 [0.0815] [0.0786] [0.0776] [0.724] [0.668] [0.683] 
Average agricultural income, logged 0.495*** 0.421*** 0.439*** 0.0946 -0.374 -0.21 
 [0.173] [0.135] [0.136] [0.715] [0.619] [0.666] 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 179 179 179 128 128 128 
R-squared 0.991 0.992 0.992 0.529 0.587 0.6 
F-statistics for instruments 24.98 18.64 16.07 26.25 17.05 16.89 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Note: Average circulation-adjusted advertising rate, a measure of A, is computed circulation-adjusted advertising rates for all 
newspapers in the city.  List of sources for advertising regulation variables is presented in Table 4.  Income variables are from U.S. 
Census 1880 and 1890, interpolated for 1881-1886.  Data on city population and newspaper data are from Ayer‘s American Newspaper 
Annual (1881-1886), originally from the U.S. Census publication. Electoral data are from Clubb et. al. (2006) dataset at ISPSR. Data 
on county seats are from ICPSR 8159 dataset, constructed by R. Sechrist. Only Republican, Democratic, or independent newspapers 
are included in the sample.   
The coefficient for city population is negative and insignificant, but being a county seat is highly significant and positive. One 
explanation is that city population is insignificant because of collinearity of city population and being a county seat, while another 
explanation suggests that publishing local ordinances in county seats decreased the space in the newspaper available for advertising, 
which drove advertising rates up. Basic collinearity diagnostics, however, rejects the presence of multicollinearity between a dummy 
for a county seat and a logged city population (VIF is less than 2 for both variables), so the second explanation seems to be more 
plausible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Local advertising profitability and independence of newspapers, city-level, Massachusetts. OLS and IV estimation 
Instrumented variable: local circulation-adjusted advertising rate 
Instruments: dummies for the presence of restrictions for outdoor advertising and handbill distribution, as regulated by local municipal ordinances 
 Dummy for independent newspaper 
 Including Boston newspapers Excluding Boston newspapers 
 OLS IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV 
Instruments  
Outdoor  
advertising 
Handbill 
distribution 
Outdoor advertising, 
handbill distribution 
 
Outdoor 
advertising 
Handbill 
distribution 
Outdoor advertising, 
handbill distribution 
Local circulation-adjusted 0.625** 0.855** 1.040*** 0.995*** 0.578* 0.561 0.902*** 0.813*** 
advertising rate [0.253] [0.335] [0.202] [0.144] [0.293] [0.426] [0.212] [0.155] 
Effect of one standard deviation  
change for given measure of A (in %) 
0.442 0.604 0.736 0.703 0.0616 0.0598 0.0962 0.0867 
City controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County electoral and economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 179 179 179 179 128 128 128 128 
R-squared 0.196 0.194 0.191 0.192 0.264 0.264 0.26 0.262 
p-value of J-statistics for overidentifying  restrictions    0.777    0.558 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by city. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Note: Average circulation-adjusted advertising rate, a measure of A, is computed circulation-adjusted advertising rates for all newspapers in the city.  In columns (2) and (4), circulation-adjusted advertising 
rate in a city is instrumented by dummies for the presence of restrictions for outdoor advertising and handbill advertising, as regulated by local municipal ordinances. List of sources is presented in Table 4. 
City controls include log of city population and dummy for being county-seat. County controls include county population, log of average wage in manufacture, log of average agricultural income per family 
and 10 electoral controls (percentage of votes for Republicans, Democrats, Greenbacks, and other parties in the most recent presidential and congressional elections, and voter turnout in these elections). Data 
on county population and income are from U.S. Census 1880 and 1890, interpolated for 1881-1886.  Data on city population and newspaper data are from Ayer‘s American Newspaper Annual (1881-1886). 
Electoral data are from Clubb et. al. (2006) dataset at ISPSR. Data on county seats are from ICPSR 8159 dataset, constructed by R. Sechrist. Only Republican, Democratic, or independent newspapers are 
included in the sample.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Year Fixed Effects for Table 3. 
 Dummy for independent newspaper 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Method of computing A 
Average A for all 
newspapers in a 
city 
Average A for all 
newspapers in a city 
Average A for all 
newspapers in a city 
Average A for all newspapers in 
a city, instrumented by average 
A in other cities in a county 
Average A for all newspapers in a 
city, computed for the same sample 
as IV regression in previous column 
Dummy for year=1880 -0.0197** -0.0293*** 0.006 -0.021** -0.020** 
 [0.009] [0.0077] [0.012] [0.008] [0.008] 
Dummy for year=1881 -0.008  0.010 -0.001 -0.0008 
 [0.0079]  [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] 
Dummy for year=1882 -0.005 0.007 0.009 0.0038 0.004 
 [0.006] [0.0047] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Dummy for year=1883  -0.011 0.011   
  [0.009] [0.007]   
Dummy for year=1884 -0.0128*** -0.0252*** -0.001 -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 [0.005] [0.0098] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] 
Dummy for year=1885 -0.007 -0.0037  -0.0016 0.0007 
 [0.007] [0.009]  [0.008] [0.008] 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by city level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Note: this table contains only coefficient for time fixed effects. Other coefficients for corresponding regressions are presented in Table 3. The specifications reported are specifications (1),(3) and (6)-(8) from Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Newspaper circulation and political affiliation of a newspaper. 
(Baseline-partisan newspapers, Democratic or Republican) 
 Logged newspaper circulation 
 OLS Matching estimator 
 All newspapers Weeklies only Dailies only 
Dailies only, for cities  
with population>10000 
All newspapers Dailies only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent newspaper (dummy) 0.00105 -0.0361** 0.189* 0.264** -.074*** .206*** 
 [0.0206] [0.0181] [0.112] [0.131] [.013] [.061] 
Fixed effects (exact match parameters) County, Year  County, Year County, Year  County, Year  County, Year County, Year 
Year of establishment -0.00879*** -0.00787*** -0.0105*** -0.0115*** Yes Yes 
 [0.000668] [0.000665] [0.00249] [0.00252]   
Log (county population) 0.435*** 0.280*** 0.643* 0.44 Yes Yes 
 [0.123] [0.100] [0.355] [0.370]   
Log (average wage in manufacture) -0.0748 -0.0231 -0.372 -0.355 Yes Yes 
 [0.0635] [0.0549] [0.286] [0.293]   
Log (average agricultural income per family)  -0.0416 -0.0167 -0.00444 0.114 Yes Yes 
 [0.0389] [0.0305] [0.196] [0.283]   
Dummy for city being a county seat 0.150*** 0.167*** -0.255 0.0196 Yes Yes 
 [0.0177] [0.0171] [0.157] [0.0508]   
Log (city population) 0.239*** 0.216*** 0.676*** 0.417*** Yes Yes 
 [0.0136] [0.0125] [0.0784] [0.0556]   
Number of newspapers in a city (proxy for competition) 0.0192* 0.00959 -0.0212* -0.0276** No No 
 [0.0110] [0.0101] [0.0112] [0.0117]   
Observations 17698 16204 1332 887 17697 1332 
R-squared (or percent of exact matches for matching) 0.706 0.675 0.837 0.71 61.9 52.65 
N of cities 2799 2747 220 113 2799 220 
F-statistics for electoral controls 1.435 0.976 0.405 0.632   
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by city. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Note: newspaper controls include a dummy variable for a daily newspaper and a number of pages in the newspaper. County controls include county population, fraction of urban population, and 10 electoral 
control variables, including percentage of votes for Republicans, Democrats, Greenbacks, and other parties in the most recent presidential and congressional elections, and voter turnout in these elections. Data 
on income and population are from U.S. Census 1880 and 1890 (reconstructed by Haines in 2005), interpolated for 1881-1886.  Newspaper data are from Ayer‘s American Newspaper Annual (1881-1886). 
Electoral data are from Clubb et. al. (2006) dataset at ISPSR. Only Republican, Democratic or Independent newspapers are included in the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Advertising and newspaper independence. Some robustness checks 
 
Dummy for independent newspaper 
Local average advertising rate (computed 
for other newspapers in a city) 
0.00626** 0.00600**  
 
 
[0.00259] [0.00256] 
  
Local average circulation-adjusted 
advertising rate (computed for other 
newspapers in a city) 
  
0.0534*** 0.0534** 
   
[0.0197] [0.0224] 
County population (logged) -0.00652 -0.0179 -0.0263 -0.0957 
 
[0.0761] [0.0768] [0.0714] [0.0774] 
Average wage in manufacture (logged) -0.0106 -0.00763 -0.0152 -0.0213 
 
[0.0222] [0.0222] [0.0230] [0.0272] 
Average agricultural income (logged) -0.011 -0.00308 0.035 0.0503 
 
[0.0482] [0.0483] [0.0504] [0.0573] 
Number of newspapers (proxy for 
competition) 
0.00104 0.000613 0.000884 0.000631 
 
[0.00335] [0.00322] [0.00294] [0.00316] 
Additional controls included 
Circulation, 
logged 
Circulation to 
degrees 1/2 to 1/5 
included 
Base year circulation 
interacted with time 
dummies 
Following variables, interacted with time dummies: base year 
circulation (logged), average agricultural income (logged), average 
wage in manufacture (logged), county population (logged), city 
population (logged), dummy for being county seat  
Fixed Effects Newspaper, Year Newspaper, Year Newspaper, Year Newspaper, Year 
Observations 15107 15107 10990 9854 
R-squared 0.921 0.922 0.912 0.907 
N of cities 1642 1642 1289 1159 
F-statistics for electoral controls 0.911 0.913 1.304 1.106 
Marginal effect 0.00199 0.0019 0.0168 0.0167 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by county  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Advertising and independent newspapers.  Matching results. 
 Dummy for independent newspaper 
 OLS Matching OLS Matching 
Dummy for circulation-adjusted advertising rate being higher than median in a state  .051*** .046*** .006 .052*** 
Fixed effects (exact matching parameters for matching) State, Year State, Year County, Year County, Year 
County and City Controls (matching parameters for matching) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22226 22226 22226 22226 
R-squared 0.154  0.328  
Percent of exact matches  98.6  56.8 
 
Table 12. Ideological bias of the members of Congress and county economic characteristics.  
(test for alternative explanation) 
 Legislator’s bias, based on 1st  dimension of $OMI$ATE score Legislator’s bias, based on 2nd dimension of $OMI$ATE score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fraction of independent newspapers -0.046    0.0660***    
 [0.0645]    [0.0244]    
Circulation-adjusted advertising rate  -0.0719    0.0484   
  [0.0647]    [0.0294]   
Fraction of Democratic newspapers   0.0574    -0.0654**  
   [0.0692]    [0.0276]  
Fraction of Republican newspapers    -0.0129    -0.00401 
    [0.0908]    [0.0333] 
Fixed effects 
Year,  
District 
Year,  
District 
Year,  
District 
Year,  
District 
Year,  
District 
Year,  
District 
Year,  
District 
Year,  
District 
Observations 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536 
R-squared 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.568 0.567 0.568 0.565 
Number of districts 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by congressional district. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Note: dependent variable is absolute value of deviation of NOMINATE score for a member of Congress from its median, based on Poole and Rosenthal (1997) data. Data on county population and urban 
population are from U.S. Census 1880 and 1890 (reconstructed by Haines in 2005), interpolated for 1881-1886.  Newspaper data are from Ayer‘s American Newspaper Annual (1881-1886). Data on county-
congressional district correspondence are from Clubb et. al. (2006) dataset at ISPSR. To construct this table, newspaper-level data were collapsed by county.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Migration and dynamic county characteristics. 
(test for alternative explanation) 
 
Independent  newspapers in a 
county, fraction 
Democratic  newspapers in a 
county,  fraction 
Republican  newspapers in a 
county, fraction 
Local circulation-adjusted 
advertising rate 
Log (County population) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Proportion of foreign- -0.0494 -0.126* 0.176* 0.0248 -1.096*** 
born population [0.0787] [0.0761] [0.100] [0.0298] [0.133] 
Fixed effects County, Year County, Year County, Year 
County,  
Year 
County,  
Year 
Observations 10265 10265 10265 9842 10265 
R-squared 0.741 0.873 0.842 0.842 0.998 
Number of counties  1947 1947 1947 1904 1947 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by county  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Note: table presents results for aggregate county-level data. Data on  foreign-born population and data on county population are from U.S. Census 1880 and 1890 (reconstructed by Haines in 2005), 
interpolated for 1881-1886.  Newspaper data are from Ayer‘s American Newspaper Annual (1881-1886). Electoral data are from Clubb et. al. (2006) dataset at ISPSR. To construct this table, newspaper-level 
data was collapsed by county.  
 
Table 14. African-American population and dynamic county characteristics. 
(test for alternative explanation) 
 
Independent  newspapers in a 
county, fraction 
Democratic  newspapers in a 
county,  fraction 
Republican  newspapers in a 
county, fraction 
Local circulation-adjusted 
advertising rate 
Log (County population) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Proportion of African- 0.0796 0.236 -0.316** -0.154 -1.469*** 
American population [0.217] [0.225] [0.136] [0.338] [0.152] 
Fixed effects County, Year County, Year County, Year 
County,  
Year 
County,  
Year 
Observations 10265 10265 10265 9842 10265 
R-squared 0.741 0.873 0.842 0.843 0.996 
Number of counties  1947 1947 1947 1904 1947 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by county  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Note: table presents results for aggregate county-level data. Data on African American population are from U.S. Census 1880 and 1890 (reconstructed by Haines in 2005), interpolated for 1881-1886.  
Newspaper data are from Ayer‘s American Newspaper Annual (1881-1886). Electoral data are from Clubb et. al. (2006) dataset at ISPSR. To construct this table, newspaper-level data was collapsed by 
county. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15. Local advertising profitability and vote margins. 
 Dummy for independent newspaper 
Local advertising circulation-adjusted 0.0901** 0.0904*** 0.0936*** 0.0665*** 
Advertising rate (A) [0.0399] [0.0237] [0.0288] [0.0219] 
Method of computing A 
Average A for all 
newspapers in a city 
Average A for all 
newspapers in a city 
Average A for all newspapers in 
a city 
Average A for all newspapers in 
a city, excluding this newspaper 
Effect of one standard deviation change 
for given measure of A (in %) 
2.37 2.37 3.0 2.2 
Vote margin in Congressional -0.000309** -0.000816*** -0.000364** -0.000360* 
elections [0.000139] [0.000228] [0.000185] [0.000185] 
Fixed effects County, Year Year Newspaper, Year Newspaper, Year 
County and city controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24168 24168 15224 15224 
R-squared 0.355 0.124 0.92 0.92 
N of counties 1599 3444 1472 1472 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by county. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Note: Vote margins are computed as absolute value of difference between percentage of votes for Democratic party and percentage of vote for Republican party. County controls include county population, 
log average wage in manufacture, log average agricultural income, and 10 electoral control variables, including percentage of votes for Republicans, Democrats, Greenbacks, and other parties in the most 
recent presidential and congressional elections, and voter turnout in these elections. City controls include dummy for being a county seat and log of city population. Data on population are from U.S. Census 
1880 and 1890, interpolated for 1881-1886.  Newspaper data and data on city population are from Ayer‘s American Newspaper Annual (1881-1886). Electoral data are from Clubb et. al. (2006) dataset at 
ISPSR. Data on county seats are from ICPSR 8159 dataset, constructed by R. Sechrist. Only Republican, Democratic, or independent newspapers are included in the sample.  
 
Table 16. Advertising and independent newspapers. More robustness checks. 
Dummy for independent newspaper 
Local average advertising rate (computed for other 
newspapers in a city) 0.0511** 0.0507** 0.0669*** 0.0672*** 
 [0.0215] [0.0213] [0.0213] [0.0213] 
County population (logged) 0.0325 0.0319 0.0632 0.0171 
 [0.0855] [0.0868] [0.0984] [0.0816] 
Average wage in manufacture (logged) -0.0224 -0.0219 -0.0308 -0.0302 
 [0.0258] [0.0256] [0.0241] [0.0240] 
Average agricultural income (logged) -0.0341 -0.0306 -0.0347 -0.0323 
 [0.0527] [0.0526] [0.0480] [0.0492] 
Number of newspapers (proxy for competition) 0.00077 0.000897 0.000688 0.00068 
 [0.00391] [0.00388] [0.00372] [0.00376] 
Legislator bias (based on 1
st
 dimension of NOMINATE 
score) 0.00956 
[0.0123] 
Legislator bias (based on 2
nd
 dimension of NOMINATE 
score) 0.051 
[0.0314] 
Fraction of foreign-born population 0.0652 
[0.216] 
Fraction of African-American population -0.388 
[0.401] 
Fixed effects 
Newspaper, 
Year 
Newspaper, 
Year 
Newspaper, 
Year 
Newspaper, 
Year 
Observations 13546 13546 15224 15224 
R-squared 0.917 0.917 0.92 0.92 
N of cities 1396 1396 1472 1472 
F-statistics for electoral controls 0.72 0.746 0.739 0.735 
 
Table 17. Independent newspapers and their own circulation-adjusted advertising rate 
Dummy for independent newspaper 
Newspaper’s own circulation-adjusted advertising rate 0.0179 0.0384** -0.00076 
[0.0170] [0.0156] [0.0168] 
County population (logged) 0.0386 0.0724*** 0.0167 
[0.0657] [0.0161] [0.0675] 
Average wage in manufacture (logged) -0.0313 -0.0425*** -0.0148 
[0.0236] [0.00987] [0.0192] 
Average agricultural income per family (logged) -0.046 0.0318** -0.0476 
[0.0429] [0.0138] [0.0388] 
Dummy for county seat -0.223*** -0.183*** 
[0.0182] [0.0135] 
City population (logged) -0.109*** -0.0441***  
[0.0120] [0.00749] 
Number of newspapers (proxy for competition) 0.0139* 0.00435 -0.0006 
[0.00797] [0.00315] [0.00359] 
Fixed Effects County, Year Year Newspaper, Year 
Observations 22639 22639 25790 
R-squared 0.373 0.126 0.922 
N of cities 3444 3444 4092 
F-statistics for electoral controls 1.171 6.973 0.97 
 
Table A1. List of sources for data on local regulations of advertising 
 
 
 
 
Charter and Revised Ordinances of the City of Beverly. Beverly, Mass., 1903 
Charter and Revised Ordinances of the City of Brockton. Brockton, Mass., 1900 
Charter and Ordinances of the City of Lowell. Lowell, Mass., 1883 
Municipal Manual of the City of Somerville. Boston, 1892 
City of Newton Revised Ordinances. Newton, Mass., 1894 
Charter and Ordinances. Gloucester, Mass., 1901 
Charter. Ordinances. Rules of the Board of Health and City Government of Malden. Boston, 1882 
Municipal Register of the City of Haverhill. Haverhill, Mass., 1897 
Charter of Laws relating to the City of  Troy. Municipal Ordinances. Troy, N.Y., 1891 
Ordinances and Rules and Orders  of the City of New Bedford, New Bedford, 1884 
Ordinances. Rules and Orders, and Laws Relating to City Affairs, 1889. Lawrence, Mass., 1890 
Charter and Ordinances of the City of Waltham. Waltham, Free Press Book and Job Office, 1886 
The City Charter as amended by subsequent legislation and the Ordinances of the City of Haverhill. Haverhill, Mass., 
1880 
Charter and Revised Ordinances of the City of Brockton. Brockton, Mass., 1900 
City Charter and Revised Ordinances of the City of Fall River. Fall River, Mass., 1887 
Laws as contained in an Act to revise and combine in a single act all existing special and local laws affecting public 
interests in the City of Brooklyn. Albany, N.Y., 1888 
The charters of the city of Brooklyn : passed June 28, 1873. Brooklyn : Daily Union Print, 1873 
The revised ordinances of 1885, of the city of Boston, as passed and approved December 14, 1885. Boston, Rockwell and 
Churchill, city printers, 1886 
The revised ordinances of the city of Boston : as passed prior to December 31, 1882. Boston, Rockwell and 
Churchill, 1882 
Charters and Ordinances, City of Ithaca, New York. Ithaca, N.Y. 1897 
